Effects of growth on relative prices in a two-good n-country model by Sérgio Ribeiro da Costa Welang
EFFECTS OF GROWTH ON RELATIVE PRICES IN 
A TWO-GOOD N-COUNTRY MODEL 
Sérgio Ribeiro da Costa Werlang* 
Fundaçào Getúlio Vargas 
Resumen: Este trabajo analiza el efecto de un incremento 
en las dotaciones en un modelo con dos bienes 
y n países. Se muestra que si la dotación del bien 
uno se incrementa, entonces su precio relativo 
al bien 2 también puede incrementarse. Sin em-
bargo, este efecto "perverso" no puede ocurrir 
si la economía está en un equilibrio de 
tâtonnement. También se muestra que hay 
"doble perversidad" en el caso de bienes nor-
males cuando el equilibrio es inestable. 
Abstract: This paper analyses the effect of an increase of 
the endowment in a two-good n-country model. 
It is shown that the endowment of good one can 
go up and the price of the same good relative to 
good two can also increase. However, this "per-
verse" effect cannot occur in both goods if the 
economy is at a tâtonnement stable equilibrium. 
This is a new restriction in the form of the equi-
librium manifold of an exchange economy. It is also 
shown thatthis "double perversity" isthecase with 
normal goods when the equilibrium is unstable. 
1. Introduction 
There are several problems in international trade which relate to how varia-
tions of endowments affects the equilibrium of the economy. The important 
questions are: (i) "The transfer problem": How does equilibrium vary when 
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there is a gift from one country to another? (ii) "The growth problem": How 
does equilibrium change when the world grows? 
Traditionally the transfer problem has been analysed in two ways: 
(i) How do equilibrium prices change with a transfer? 
(ii) How do welfare levels of countries change with a transfer? 
These two questions have been thoroughly discussed in the literature. 
Basically Samuelson (1952 and 1954) posed them. The price changes were 
studied by Chipman (1974) and Jones (1970 and 1975). The welfare changes 
were studied by several authors. The state of the art is Dixit (1983) and 
Majumdar and Mitra (1985). The reader interested in bibliographical com-
pleteness should refer to these and other papers cited in here. 
The growth problem literature has evolved in a different manner: Only 
questions related to welfare effects were raised. As it is, the fact that growth 
may cause "bad" welfare effects, normally understood as "immiserising 
growth", was point out by Bhagwati (1958). The state of the art is given by 
Mas-Colell (1976) and Mantel (1984). Again one should not take this as being 
a complete list of references for the problem. In particular one article, that of 
Jones (1985), gives a very coherent survey of the growth and the transfer 
problems, and how one can immerse an n-country growth analysis into an 
n + 1-country transfer analysis. 
The question which this note addresses is the related price effect of 
growth. This is also a problem which is linked with the still open question of 
finding the structure of the graph of the Walras' correspondence, that is to 
say, the price-endowment equilibrium set of an exchange economy. On this 
see Balasko (1975 and 1988), Schecter (1979). In particular, one can easily see 
that the main proposition imposes some restriction on the Walras' correspon-
dence graph that were to date ignored. 
The point tackled here is: In a two-good, ^-country economy, when is it 
possible that, given an increase of the initial endowment of a good of a given 
country, the relative price of this good will rise? 
The example in the next section will show that such a perverse 
situation can occur. It will also be clear that this effect may be as high as % 
one wishes. 
Section three contains the main result of this note: This perverse effect 
cannot happen with both goods of a given country in economies with two 
goods if the equilibrium is stable, or downward sloping. One says an equi-
librium is downward sloping, or stable, when an excess demand for a good 
results in an increase in its price to clear the market. This condition is 
generically verified at the equilibrium prices if equilibrium is unique. The 
economies which are considered here are such that equilibrium prices are 
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leastone individual such that his demand for the given good goes to infinity 
when the price of the good goes to zero. 
The last section argues that in the case of an equilibrium with upward 
sloping demand, or unstable equilibrium, "double perversity" is possible. 
Not only that, but also it is the normal case. This may be seen as another strong 
fact to consider such unstable equilibria as unreasonable. 
Throughout the rest of the paper the word "consumer" will be used 
instead of "country". Also we are going to be dealing only with small changes 
of the endowments. 
2. A Perverse Example 
In this section the following perverse case is analysed: In a two-goods ex-
change economy it is possible that an increase in the endowment of a good 
causes a rise in its price, even in a downward-sloping demand equilibrium 
(or tâtonnement stable). Fix one of the consumers, say consumer 1, and increase 
her endowment of good 2. At first this results in a higher income for the 
consumer. If good 1 is inferior, then the consumer will demand less of it. 
Also good l's supply remains unchaged, since we increased only the supply 
of good 2. Thus there is an excess supply of good 1. As the quilibrium is a 
stable one, this requires the price of good 1 to go down. This is the same as 
saying that the price of good 2 goes up. Hence one sees that it is perfectly 
reasonable that the perverse effect described above happens. One can also see 
that this can occur for good 2 only if good 1 is inferior. 
It may be of interest to ask whether this can happen to good 1 itself. There 
are two ways of checking that. The first one is to observe that we can 
interchange the names of the two goods. In this way good 2 is inferior and 
good 1 increases its endowment, which means a higher price of good 1. The 
other more cumbersome, but nevertheless very enlightening way is direct 
verification. Suppose the endowment of good 1 goes up. Then, as a first 
impact, income rises. Assume good 1 is normal. As a result demand for good 
» 1 increases. However, its supply also went up. Suppose the increase in 
demand is larger than the increase in supply, what amounts to assuming that 
the second good is inferior, in a two-good world. Then there is an excess 
demand for good 1, and its price goes up as a result of being a stable 
equilibrium. This description is exactly the opposite of the one before, because 
in a world with two goods one is inferior if and only if the other is "supernor-
mal", that is to say, an increase in its supply causes such an increase in its 
demand due to the higher income level, that demand surpasses supply. 
It is interesting to note that such an effect can happen to any extent one 
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the following consumers. Let ^ mean the demand for the y-th good by the 
i'-th consumer, px and p2 are the prices of goods 1 and 2, / is income, /' and 
I
2 are the incomes of the first and second consumers, respectively. 




Pi ' Pi 
where 
P 
It is immediate to check that this is a neoclassical consumer. 
(ii) Consumer 2 is Cobb-Douglas with income shares a of good 1 and 
l-ccofgood2, a e [0, 1]: 
^2](/7, ,p2,P) = — , 
E , lis U ~
 A)' 
"2 
(Hi) Endowments are (w,, , w]2) and (w2] , w22) for consumers 1 and 2, 
respectively. 
Then, setting p2 = 1, p] = p, /' = /w,, + w]2, I
2=pw2l + w22, and equating 
excess demand for good 1 to zero, we obtain: 
pw,,+w]2 pw2l+w22 
- -expt-C/nv., + w,,)"] + a—- --(w„ +w7,) = 0. 
Taking implicit derivatives: 
3p exp[-(/w,, +wI2)"] [1 -n(pw„+iv|2)"] 
aw,2~" - wu -(1 -a)w21 +wnexp[-(/7wn + w|2)"] [1 -n(/wn ' 
It is easy to see that by varying the parameters this value can be as 
negative as one wants, independently of p. Just make w,2 large enough and 
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3. Double Perversity Impossible at a Stable Equilibrium 
Given one consumer in a two-goods economy, we will show that, if the 
equilibrium is stable, it is not possible that an increase in the initial endow-
ment of each of the goods causes an increase in each of their relative prices. 
One can intuitively see why. Increase, as before, his endowment of good 2. In 
order for the described perversity to occur, it was shown that good 1 had to 
be inferior. Then good 2 has to be normal, and, therefore, by the same 
argument of the previous section, good 1 cannot exhibit such perverse effect. 
Obviously the argument also goes the other way around. Formally: 
PROPOSITION. Suppose there are n consumers and two goods. Consumption spaces 
are R\ and demand functions are continuously differentiable in prices (/>, , p2)Rl + 
and income IR+ +. Also assume equilibrium prices are strictly positive. Suppose initial 
endowments are also strictly positive. Finally assume the equilibrium is stable, or 
downward sloping, in the sense that the derivative of the excess demand for good 1 
with respect to its relative price is strictly negative. Then: 
(i) and both exist, the notation being the same as in the previous 
section;
 n dwn 
(ii) it is not possible that > 0 and r^
2- < 0. 
dwu dw]2 
PROOF. Let c,
1 (p, , p2 , /') and P] , p2 ,I
2 ,. .., / ") be the demands for good 
1 of the first consumer and the rest of the economy, respectively. Set 
/?, = p and p2 = 1. Then, as before, /' = pwu + w,2, and I
2,.. ., I
n are inde-
pendent of w,, and wn. Define the excess demand for good 1: 
Z{p, wn, wl2) = t,\p, \ ,pwu +W12)+Ç(A>, I,/
2,.. J
n)-^wn 
dp_ = _(dZ\ ' dz 
dwu [dp I dwu 
and 
But 
dZ  3&i 
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and 
Thus 
dZ = d¿_ 
dw~2~ di 







Again, as ^ < 0, it follows that 
dp 
dp ^ dp 
dwu
 P dw]2 
dp dp  dp dp 
Hence ^>0=>^>0 and ^<0=>^-<0. 
aw,, "
w]2 dw,^ dw¡,  "12 
By the verbal argument at the beginning of this section, it should be clear 
that the differentiability hypothesis is merely technical, and is not necessary 
to prove the result. The proposition abone shows a restriction on the graph of 
the Walras' correspondence that was not known: When the Walras' correspon-
dence is a function, generically it occurs that excess demand is dowsword 
sloping at the equilibrium price (a consequence of the index theorem). Thus, 
for such economics it cannot happen that both > 0 and < 0. 
aw,, ow,n 
4. Double Perversity Possible with Unstable Equilibrium 
As one can see from the preceding section, the crucial hypothesis is that of 
stability. In this section it is shown that with an unstable equilibrium it is 
possible to have "double perversity". If the endowment of good 2 is increased, 
this increases the income, and hence demand for good 1. Then, as its supply 
is fixed, there is an excess demand for it. But the equilibrium is unstable (or 
upward sloping), which implies that the relative price of good 1 falls, which 
in turn means that the relative price of good 2 goes up. 
To see that the same happens with an increase in good l's endowment 
(of the same consumer), one can do as before: Either rename the goods, or do 
it directly. In order to do so, observe that good 2 being normal, if good 1 is 
also normal, then good 1 cannot be "supernormal" in the sense described in 
section 2. Thus an increase in good l's endowment causes its demand to 
increase less than its supply. Hence there is an excess supply of good 1. The 
fact the equilibrium is unstable assures that the relative price of good 1 goes 
up, and the double perversity is verified. EFFECTS OF GROWTH ON RELATIVE PRICES 63 
It remains to be shown that it is possible to have an unstable equilibrium 
where both goods are normal. For this one invokes a result by Mantel (1976) 
which essentially says that any excess demand function in a /-good economy 
can be obtained by means of / strictly convex and monotonic consumers, all 
of which are homothetic. Thus one can think of an economy wit two goods 
and three equilibria, two of which are stable, and one unstable. By Mantel's 
result one can get it with homothetic consumers. For a homothetic consumer 
all goods are normal. By the verbal argument earlier it follows that at the 
unstable equilibrium of this economy double perversity occurs. 
From the reasoning above it is easy to attest that "double perversity" is 
actually a very common case at an unstable equilibrium. This should be an 
additional fact to consider such equilibria as unreasonable. 
References 
Balasto, Y. (1975). "Some Results on Uniqueness and on Stability of Equilibrium in 
General Equilibrium Theory", Journal of Mathematical Economics, vol. 2, pp. 95-118. 
(1988). Foundations of the Theory of General Equilibrium, New York, Academic 
Press. 
Bhagwati, J. N. (1958). "Immiserising Growth: A Geometrical Note", Review of Economic 
Studies, vol. 25, pp. 201-205. 
Chipman, J. S. (1974). "The Transfer Problem Once Again", in G. Horwich and P. 
Samuelson (eds.), Trade Stability and Macroeconomics: Essays in Honor of Lloyd A. 
Metzler, New York, Academic Press. 
Dixit, A. (1983). "The Multi-Country Transfer Problem", Economics Letters, vol. 13, pp. 
49-53. 
Jones, R. (1970). "The Transfer Problem Revisited", Económica, vol. 37, pp. 178-184. 
(1975). "Presumption and the Transfer Problem", Journal of International 
Economics, vol. 5, pp. 263-274. 
(1985). "Income Effects and Paradoxes in the Theory of International Trade", 
The Economic Journal, vol. 95, pp. 330-344. 
Majumdar, M„ and T. Mitra (1985). "A Result on the Transfer Problem in International 
Trade Theory", Journal of International Economics, vol. 19, pp. 161-170. 
Mantel, R. (1976). "Homothetic Preferences and Community Excess Demand Func-
tions", Journal of Economic Theory, vol. 12, pp. 197-201. 
(1984). "Substitutability and the Welfare Effects of Endowment Increases", 
Journal of International Economics, vol. 17, pp. 325-334. 
Mas-Collel, A. (1976). "En torno a una propiedad poco atractiva del equilibrio com-
petitivo", Moneda y c rédito, vol. 136, pp. 11-27. 
Samuelson, P. A. (1952). "The Transfer Problem and Transport Costs: The Terms of 
Trade When Impediments Are Absent", The Economic Journal, vol. 64, pp. 264-289. 
(1954). "The Transfer Problem and Transport Cost, II: Analysis of Effects of 
Trade Impediments", The Economic Journal, vol. 64, pp. 264-289. 
Schecter, S. (1979). "On the Structure of the Equilibrium Manifold ', Journal of Mathe-
matical Economics, vol. 6, pp. 1-5. 